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When it comes to consumption and saving, there are two groups of 
people: those who produce resources actively in the labor market, and 
those who depend on what others produce because they are either too 
young or too old to work. For the world as a whole, the ratio of poten-
tial dependents to producers has been declining since 1965—mostly 
because fertility rates have dropped more quickly than life expectancy 
has increased. However, this shift in the age structure of society—the so-
called demographic dividend—is ending (Figure 6.1.)1
The steady decline of the dependency ratio worldwide since 1965 
stopped in 2010 (United Nations, 2015). From now on, the gains of hav-
ing fewer young people to care for will be outweighed by the burden of 
having to attend to a growing elderly population.2
Nowhere in the world will these demographic changes be as intense as 
in Latin America and the Caribbean. For the past five decades, the region’s 
decline in the dependency ratio has been the steepest in the world. In 1965, 
for each 100 individuals of working age (15 to 65 years old) in the region, 
there were 90 young and old dependents; today there are fewer than 50. 
In a way, this has been a gift. A greater number of people have been con-
tributing to production, savings, and growth. However, the gift is really a 
loan that will have to be repaid in the decades to come. As the low fertil-
ity rates that triggered the demographic dividend play out, countries will 
age, and they will age rapidly. The demographic dividend is projected to 
end in 2020. From 2020 to 2100, the number of dependents will increase 
by 35.5—again the largest increase of any region (Figure 6.1). In 2085, Latin 
America and the Caribbean will surpass Europe as the region with the high-
est share of elderly per working age population (ECLAC, 2014b).
Providing for the elderly is an enormous task that the region is not 




funds to finance development. The future of an aging society is a chal-
lenge that requires action sooner rather than later. However, conveying 
the need for swift action to policymakers is difficult because the region 
is still enjoying the demographic dividend. Demographic trends fueled 
an important part of the region’s recent economic performance.3
Not all the news is bad. Demographics will still provide room for 
maneuver for several years—in some countries more than in others. For 
countries like Belize, Bolivia, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, and Paraguay, the 
demographic dividend will last two to three more decades (Figure 6.1). 
For countries like Bahamas, Barbados, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Jamaica, 
and Trinidad and Tobago, the demographic dividend is all but gone. 
Figure 6.1 Extension of the Demographic Dividend
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on United Nations (2015).
Note: The bars depict the period in which the total dependency ratio (Population <15 + Population 
>65/Population 15–64) is falling. 
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However, even for these countries, the dependency ratios, while increas-
ing, will remain relatively low by historical standards for several years 
(United Nations, 2015). In addition, the region has other unexploited divi-
dends that can extend the demographic dividend, at least temporarily. 
One of them is the increase in the participation of women in labor mar-
ket. Female participation rates are still low, compared to more advanced 
countries (Morton et al., 2014). Another is to decrease the large share of 
youngsters who are neither participating in the labor market nor study-
ing. Some 22 percent of the region’s youth were idle in 2013 (Alaimo et 
al., 2015). Furthermore, reducing the large share of the labor force who do 
not work in the formal sector—and thus do not pay taxes or contribute to 
pensions—could help to boost savings and growth (Bosch, Melguizo, and 
Pagés, 2013; Levy, 2008; Hsieh and Klenow, 2014).
Governments, households, and firms must address the challenge of 
population aging by combining efforts. This chapter argues that improv-
ing savings in general and pension systems in particular, are necessary 
steps to ensure that longer lives will mean better lives.
More Elderly with More Needs
During the past 40 years, the age profile of the population and depen-
dency ratios in Latin America and the Caribbean have changed 
dramatically. Figure 6.2 shows how this profile has evolved and how it is 
likely to continue. The change in the share of the population over 65 years 
Figure 6.2 Age Profile in Latin America and the Caribbean
























Source: Authors’ calculations based on United Nations (2015). 
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old is especially striking, from a very small portion 50 years ago to a sig-
nificant percentage in the future. At the same time, fertility has fallen from 
5.9 births per 1,000 women in 1950–55 to 2.15 in 2010–15, and is projected 
to decline even further to 1.78 in 2045–50. Around 2050, life expectancy 
and fertility rates in Latin America and the Caribbean are expected to con-
verge to the levels of more advanced countries (United Nations, 2015).
Not only will the number of older people be greater, but so too will 
the portion of the very old with higher needs. While less than 2 per-
cent of the population in Latin America and the Caribbean is older than 
85, by the end of the century, that share will increase to more than 8 
percent. The need for care of the elderly over the age of 85 increases 
significantly, despite technological advances. The share of adults that 
need help with functional activities of daily life (FADL) or instrumental 
activities of daily life (IADL)4 increases between two to five times after 
the age of 80, surveys conducted in Latin American cities in 2002 indi-
cate (Table 6.1). Other sources suggest the same pattern. For instance, 
a survey conducted in Chile in 2009 showed that 12.8 percent of the 
elderly aged 60–64 were dependent in some way, while this percent-
age increased to more than 65 percent at ages 85 or over (SENAMA, 
2009). This situation is similar in more advanced countries with better 
health systems. In countries like Italy, Germany, and Spain, the increase 
in the case of FADL is from nearly 10 percent at ages 60–64 to more 
than 30 percent for those over 75 years old. In the case of IADL, depen-
dence at older ages is three times higher than for those between 65 and 



















65–80 4.0 4.6 7.7 10.2 6.7 6.4 3.8
80 + 18.8 17.8 21.9 33.8 23.2 24.4 13.8
IADL
65–80 11.2 14.7 31.1 23.1 20.7 25.3 9.9
80 + 29.1 36.8 59.6 55.1 50.7 51.8 35.4
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Health, Well-being and Aging Survey (CDE and others, 
2002).
Note: FADL = functional activities of daily living; IADL = instrumental activities of daily living.
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74, reaching almost 40 percent in countries like Italy and Spain. There-
fore, even if overall health conditions in Latin America and the Caribbean 
improve, dependency rates of the very elderly will still likely increase as 
life expectancy rises. Compounding the problem, as societies age, more 
people need care, but fewer caregivers are available, given the drop in 
fertility (WHO, 2015).
In a world where more people are both elderly and dependent, two 
main challenges loom for future generations: providing health care and 
income support (pensions) for the elderly. Combined, these challenges 
could prove burdensome.
Taking care of the elderly is substantially more expensive than tak-
ing care of the young. Evidence from both OECD member-states and 
Latin American and Caribbean countries shows that people spend a 
substantial portion of their medical expenses in the last decade of life, 
and that the percentage of people at this stage is increasing as the 
population ages. Health care spending in per capita terms is between 
four and ten times higher for an 80 year-old than for a 3 year-old (see 
Figure 6.3).
The shift in population composition will substantially increase health 
care costs. Currently, the elderly consume 17 percent of total health expen-
ditures in Latin America and the Caribbean (even though they make up 
less than 8 percent of the population): this share is projected to rise to over 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on National Transfer Accounts Database, http://www.ntac-
counts.org.
Note: Per capita health care consumption as a percentage of lifetime average health care consumption.
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50 percent in 2070 (United Nations, 2015). Today, families finance much 
of the health care needs of the elderly, but as the size of families shrinks, 
it will be harder to cope with higher costs. Thus, countries will have to find 
resources to finance curative and palliative services. Preventive services 
are another way to control costs and improve the health of the elderly. 
The role of chronic diseases on the costs of health care, and the preva-
lence of these conditions at old age, have been well documented. Future 
health expenditures due to the change in the age structure will depend on 
actions taken to prevent the impact of chronic disease (see Saad, 2011).
The other major challenge for Latin America and the Caribbean 
will be how to finance pensions, particularly because, despite relatively 
young populations, governments are already spending substantially 
more on the old than on the young. Indeed, total spending on education 
in Brazil and Uruguay accounted for 5.3 percent and 3.8 percent of GDP 
in 2009, respectively, and total spending on social security and pen-
sions reached 13.8 percent and 11.7 percent on the same year for these 2 
countries. In per capita terms, current public benefits for the young are 
significantly lower than for the elderly. For instance, on average for the 
region, public expenditure on social security and pensions per person 
older than 65, amounted to more than five times the level of expenditure 
on education per child under 20 in 2015 (ECLAC, 2015a).
Population aging will increase the pensions’ financing challenge 
as well. One way to quantify the magnitude of this challenge is to cal-
culate what would be the future level of spending on pensions taking 
into account the projected demographic changes. If by 2100 the region 
keeps spending the same amount per person over 65 (as a share of 
GDP) on pensions as it is spending now, total expenditure would have 
to increase five-fold on average. Some countries, including Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Panama, and venezuela, might need to spend more than 
20 percent of GDP on pensions (Figure 6.4). This amount of spending on 
pensions alone would probably crowd out other expenditures. If nothing 
is done, then the region might end up spending less on other produc-
tivity-enhancing investments just when boosting productivity would be 
critical for growth in the region in the face of aging.
Countries need to understand that more resources will inevitably be 
required to address the necessities of an aging population. How much 
will be needed in the future depends greatly on the package of benefits 
promised to the elderly, and on when they would start receiving those 
transfers. More developed countries, which are at a further advanced 
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stage in the demographic transition, should be a reference for the region 
to prepare adequately for the challenge that aging presents. Providing 
adequate conditions for the elderly to decide how long to work is an 
important component of old-age policies. Pensions are a critical element 
in this equation (Chapter 7).
Facing the Challenge: More and Better Savings
To meet the needs of the elderly, countries can pursue essentially two 
strategies. One is to “promise” the elderly that societies will take care of 
them (in exchange for contributions made during the working years, as 
part of family arrangements, or as a citizen’s right). The other is to set 
resources aside (i.e., saving) when countries are young and use them as 
they age.5 Pension arrangements broadly follow these two strategies 
(see Box 6.1). It is important to understand that aging will pose impor-
tant challenges to both strategies.
Figure 6.4 Current and Future Public Spending on Pensions 
Pension expenditures as a percentage of GDP



















Source: Authors’ calculations based on ECLAC (2015b) and CELADE (2015). 
Note: Pension spending in 2015 is calculated by multiplying the average pension by the share of 
pension recipients according to household surveys (see Chapter 7 for details). Pension expenditures 
in 2100 are calculated leaving expenditure per capita (as a share of GDP) constant at 2015 levels 
multiplied by the growth factor of people over 65 between 2015 and 2100.
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Fulfilling Promises
Promising a pension in the future in exchange for contributions today is 
how most pension systems in the world operate. Most mandatory pen-
sion systems have at least a component that is a defined-benefit system 
(PAYG/DB), either unfunded or usually only partially funded. In these 
systems, the contributions of current workers’ pay for the pensions that 
were promised in the past to other workers (see Box 6.1).
Fulfilling that promise in periods of rapid demographic change is a 
challenge. As the proportion of the elderly increases, more and more 
resources are required from the shrinking pool of working populations 
in the form of pension contributions, taxes, or intra-family transfers. The 
kind of promises a country can afford is largely driven by demographic 
trends (see Box 6.2). As these trends change, so do the implicit rates of 
return that a pay-as-you-go (PAYG/DB) system can offer in a sustainable 
way, given a certain level of contributions and a certain retirement age.
(continued on next page)
BOX 6.1. PENSION SYSTEMS: DEFINING THE CONCEPTS
Types of pension systems
Defined-benefit systems (DB). The pension level is determined by a rule based 
on the number of contributions and the employee’s salary in the final years of 
work. The benefits rule may be set according to the final salary payment or a 
longer period (such as the final five or ten years of contributions). This rule is 
usually not actuarially fair, and entails subsidies within or across generations. 
This type of system can be funded or not; it is usually partially funded.
Defined-contribution system (DC). The pension is determined by the value of 
the assets accumulated by an individual over his or her working life. The ben-
efits may be withdrawn all at once, scheduled for programmed withdrawals, 
or used to purchase an annuity, which would provide monthly income for the 
remainder of the individual’s life. The formula is actuarially fair. There are no 
subsidies across or within generations, unless there is a guaranteed minimum 
pension. Usually these systems are funded, but not necessarily. When the sys-
tem is not funded, it is called a notional defined contribution system.
Noncontributory pension (NCP) or Social Pensions (SP). The pension ben-
efits do not come from any type of contribution made by the individual. They 
may be granted universally, as in Bolivia, or targeted as a poverty prevention 
device. This system can also be funded, partially funded, or not funded.
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For most Latin American and Caribbean countries with PAYG/DB 
pension systems, the promised benefits are significantly higher than 
what these countries can afford. On average, in 2015 given current con-
tribution rates, retirement ages, system rules, and demographics, the 
pensions that could be financed correspond to around 37 percent of the 
worker’s final salary (the variation across countries is substantial). By 
contrast, the average PAYG/DB system promised pensions equivalent to 
67 percent of the worker’s final salary. The demographic transition will 
make that promise even more difficult to fulfill. By 2100, the pension that 
can be financed by future contributors will be only 15 percent of the final 
salary for the same set of parameters (see Box 6.2).
In addition to the high fiscal burden, these promised benefits will 
likely be paid to a relatively small share of future retirees. This is so 
because pension coverage is very low in the region. The tension between 
increasing coverage and maintaining a sustainable system will be a 
key challenge to fulfilling past promises. Increasing coverage without 
Funding
Fully funded. Pension benefits are paid from the assets accumulated through 
the pension plan. Therefore, pension fund liabilities are fully matched by assets.
Partially funded. Pension benefits are paid both from the accumulated as-
sets and current contributions from workers or general taxes collected by the 
state. Therefore, liabilities are partially matched by assets.
Unfunded. Pension benefits are paid from contributions or general taxes col-
lected by the state. These systems are typically called pay-as-you-go (PAYG).
Although in theory the combination of systems and funding schemes can 
vary (see Barr and Diamond, 2006), the region’s defined-benefit systems 
are either unfunded or partially funded. This situation requires a transfer of 
workers’ assets across generations, from those of working age who make 
contributions to elderly adults who contributed in the past and are now col-
lecting a pension. Fiscal risks for these systems will be greater as demographic 
pressures mount. Noncontributory pensions (NCP) are an extreme example of 
a defined-benefit system in which no one contributes directly; instead, they 
must be funded through general revenues or reserves, or a combination.
Defined-contribution (DC) systems are generally fully funded. Therefore, 
each generation’s pension is financed by its own savings.
BOX 6.1. (continued)
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BOX 6.2.  FUNDING TO COPE WITH DEMOGRAPHIC SHIFTS
Demography will transform how much citizens can expect from their pension 
contributions if systems are to be affordable. This calculation is not easy and 
depends on the unknown evolution of many variables over long periods of 
time. However, understanding the balance between what countries promise 
their elderly and what they ask in the form of contributions and retirement 
age, is crucial for a proper strategy to cope with demographic shifts.
Demographic forces have a different impact depending on the type of 
pension system. In systems with PAYG pillars, the expected rate of return for 
pension financing is the rate of growth of aggregate taxable salaries (Samu-
elson, 1958; Aaron, 1966). This is the rate at which wages increase times the 
increase in the size of the contributor’s base. Hence, as the contribution’s base 
decreases, so does the average pension that can be paid without relying on 
other funding sources.
Fully funded capitalization systems will also be affected by demographic 
changes. As Attanasio et al. (2015) show, in an aging world, interest rates will 
be lower, decreasing the returns to pension savings. Furthermore, if the retire-
ment age remains constant as longevity increases, those savings will generate 
lower pensions.
This box estimates the pension based on the last salary (replacement rate) 
that the average worker should expect under: (i) a sustainable PAYG system; 
and (ii) a fully funded system, and compares them with what countries are 
actually promising (Figures B6.1 and B6.2). There are three main messages.
1. Countries are making unrealistic promises
For most Latin American and Caribbean countries that have a pay-as-you-go/
defined-benefit (PAYG/DB) pension pillar, promised benefits are significantly 
higher than what these countries can afford in a sustainable way. This implies 
that in order to meet those promises, countries will probably have to draw 
resources from elsewhere outside the pension system and trade-offs will arise 
between competing development needs.
The mismatch between promises and what can be afforded occurs be-
cause benefits are generous with respect to the contribution rate (which is 
calculated as a percentage of a worker’s salary) and retirement age in the 
country. For example, in Honduras, whose contribution rate is only 3 percent 
of the salary, retirees are entitled to a pension that could be between 65 per-
cent and 70 percent of the final salary (although with a relatively low pension 
ceiling). In Jamaica and Haiti, which also have contribution rates of 3 per-
cent, retirees can receive benefits in the range of 30 percent of their final 
salary. While this is significantly lower, it is still very generous given the level of 
contributions paid. For PAYG/DB pillars in countries like Belize, Mexico, Costa 
Rica, venezuela, and Ecuador with contributions between 6 and 8.7 percent 
of salary, promised replacement rates are over 60 percent with respect to the 
final salary. In Mexico, for a contribution rate of 6.3 percent of salary, some 
(continued on next page)
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(continued on next page)
beneficiaries are entitled to a pension close to 100 percent of their final salary.a 
Nicaragua and Paraguay, which have somewhat higher contribution rates, 
have committed to pensions close to the level of the worker’s final salary. But, 
as shown in panel a, this might still be unaffordable with the prevalent contri-
bution rates (11 percent and 13 percent, respectively) and current retirement 
age (60 years) in those countries.
The non-affordability problem becomes aggravated as the population 
ages. Simulations show that in all cases, the affordable replacement rates 
over the 2095–2100 period are significantly below the affordable replacement 
rates in the present. For promised benefits to be affordable, huge increases in 
contribution rates would be needed (or retirement ages should be increment-
ed substantially). For instance, in Nicaragua and Paraguay, where the current 
contribution rate is 11 percent and 13 percent, respectively, and promised ben-
efits are over 90 percent of the final salary at age 60, contributions would 
need to be around 25 percent in 2010–15 and soar to over 70 percent in 2100, 
in order for benefits to be paid without generating an actuarial deficit.
BOX 6.2. (continued)
Figure B6.1  Promised and Affordable Replacement Rates in PAYG/DB and 
FF Systems for Retirees in 2010–15 and 2095–2100
































2.  Moving to funding might help but pensions will probably remain lower 
than promised
Suppose now, that the system was fully funded; i.e., that the same worker 
accumulated contributions in an individual account and was paid the same 
promised pension at retirement. Of course, the affordability of the promised 
pension (assumed to be the same amount as in the preceding example) will 
now hinge on the returns on the accumulated assets. To assess the level of af-
fordable replacement rates, the exercise assumes a constant real rate of return 
of 3.5 percent on accumulated assets. Panel b of Figure B6.1 illustrates the 
affordable replacement rates now and in 2095–2100, taking into account how 
demographic changes impact affordable benefits under fully funded systems.
Overall, as panel b shows, compared to the unfunded PAYG/DB, the 
level of affordable benefits is generally higher and the impact of aging is 
generally smaller for fully funded schemes (assuming a 3.5 percent return). 
Moving toward funding could help increase savings and also the capacity of 
(continued on next page)
Figure B6.1  Promised and Affordable Replacement Rates in PAYG/DB and 
FF Systems for Retirees in 2010–15 and 2095–2100 (continued)
b. Simulated Fully Funded Financing Formula Assuming 3.5 Percent Real Return
Replacement rates (percentage)
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on system’s design parameters and their own assumptions.
Note: PAYG = pay as you go, DB = defined benefit, FF = fully funded.
BOX 6.2. (continued)
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increasing contributions (for example through noncontributory pen-
sions) might make it difficult to sustain the system in some countries. On 
the other hand, low coverage directs benefits to relatively high-income 
people (who tend to be the ones that are covered), resulting in high 
inequality.
Families face similar challenges. The way families take care of elderly 
relatives resembles a PAYG/DB system. The young take care of the old 
with their own resources, not in exchange for previous payments but 
because of family altruism. This arrangement will also be tested in the 
future. Smaller families will find it more difficult to take care of a greater 
number of elderly.
countries to finance adequate benefits for future retirees for relatively low 
interest rates. Nevertheless, pensions might still need to be lower than cur-
rently promised benefits in some countries and/or parameters might need 
to be changed.
These exercises may overestimate the benefits of funding as they may 
not take into account the indirect impact of declining real returns on savings 
as the population ages. In simulations by Attanasio et al. (2015), the world’s 
interest rate declines from 4 percent in 2010 to 1.5 percent by 2100. If this were 
the case, increasing funding would provide less benefit. On the flip side, if sav-
ings are well invested and thus generate higher productivity growth, then the 
benefits of funding pensions would be higher.
3. Some countries will benefit more from funding than others.
In relation to present time affordability, Panel b shows that for some countries 
with relatively young populations, including Belize and Guatemala, afford-
able replacement rates under fully funded arrangements are lower than 
under unfunded PAYG/DB. For other countries—for example, the Bahamas, 
Ecuador, Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, and venezuela—fund-
ing helps to increase affordability, but by less than 20 percent vis-à-vis the 
affordability of the unfunded PAYG/DB. Finally, for countries with a more 
advanced demographic transition, such as Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, 
the benefits of funding in terms of increasing affordability are very large 
vis-à-vis the PAYG/DB systems. Nevertheless, it is important to consider that 
funding implies important transition costs, given that rights to retired work-
ers must be preserved.
a This system has been replaced by a fully funded system, and therefore this extremely high 
level of benefits is transitory.
BOX 6.2. (continued)
144 SAvING FOR DEvELOPMENT
Saving for the Future
Saving for the future is a reasonable way to prepare for the demographic 
change, but it is not without problems. Putting resources aside, invest-
ing them, and using them when needed is a good strategy from the 
individual point of view. Intuitively, the more countries save, the less 
they will need of current transfers from the working generation. How-
ever, what may be optimal from the point of view of the individual may 
not be optimal in the context of global aging. Indeed, if a large pro-
portion of the population saves during their active years and then sells 
those assets to the next generation (which will consist of fewer people 
because of the demographic transition) the prices of those assets will 
decline, and hence the ability of this up-and-coming group to finance its 
future will be at risk. One of the key findings in Attanasio et al. (2015) is 
that future returns on saving (i.e., interest rates) in an aging world will be 
lower. Indeed, a situation in which there is “too much saving” can lead 
to an inefficiently high level of capital (Diamond, 1965). However, this is 
definitely not the case in Latin America and the Caribbean in the pres-
ent, where more saving is needed to finance productive investment (see 
Chapter 4). Even if interest rates decline in the future as the population 
ages, the affordable level of pension might still be higher for countries 
that built savings buffers (see Box 6.2).
A crucial point to understand is that there is no unique way of sav-
ing for the future. Countries that have chosen PAYG/DB pension systems 
can and should save by reforming the parameters of PAYG/DB systems 
(i.e., retirement age, contribution rates, and salary replacement rates) 
that threaten their sustainability. Setting aside resources, either public or 
private, while demographics still permit, to fund future pensions in prep-
aration for the demographic transition is another way of saving.
Transitioning from PAYG/DB to fully funded defined-contribution 
systems with individual accounts is yet another way to increase saving. 
That was the route taken in many countries in the 1990s. However, this 
is not a magic solution. It must take into account the transition costs 
of meeting the obligations of past promises. As discussed in Chapter 
7, these transition costs have proven to be very large for many coun-
tries.6 In addition, mandatory contributions to individual accounts may 
not necessarily increase private saving if they displace saving through 
non-pension vehicles (Attanasio and Rohwedder, 2003; Attanasio and 
Brugiavini, 2003). In all, the evidence shows that for countries that 
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switched from PAYG/DB to defined-contribution systems, the resources 
channeled to individual accounts were not fully offset by a decrease in 
non-pension saving, and thus aggregate saving increased (see Bebczuk 
[2015a] for a recent survey of the literature and new results). Even so, 
funding (saving) entails other problems related to risk sharing and pen-
sion adequacy that are present in defined-contribution systems. These 
issues are addressed in more detail in Chapter 7.
More—and Better—Savings to Enhance Growth
Not only does the region need more savings, but it also needs bet-
ter savings. Being prepared for the future entails both an increase in 
savings, which will alleviate the burden on future generations, and an 
improvement in the efficiency with which those savings are used, which 
will boost productivity, and therefore the returns to those savings (see 
Chapter 10). Savings can help a society and individuals prepare for the 
future in at least two ways. First, savings that are channeled into produc-
tive investments with higher returns can help overcome the demographic 
transition. Of course, this requires well-functioning financial markets to 
intermediate savings (see Chapter 11). Second, if savings lead to higher 
aggregate productivity growth, they support whatever strategy a coun-
try has chosen to take care of the elderly. For example, if pension design 
entails benefits based on intergenerational promises (as PAYG/DB sys-
tems), higher productivity leading to larger output can help meet those 
promises, even as the share of dependents increases with population 
aging.7 If, instead, accumulated assets back pensions (as in defined-con-
tribution systems), a smaller cohort of workers with higher wages can 
support the demand for assets and mitigate a drop in rates of return. 
Any policy that promotes productivity growth can thus help alleviate the 
ill effects of an aging society (See Box 6.3).
How Is the Region Preparing for the Future?
Despite better macroeconomic management and pension reforms in 
recent decades, the region is ill prepared to confront the challenges of 
the demographic transition. Participation in formal pension plans is low; 
thus, so is pension coverage. Other forms of saving are not playing a sig-
nificant role in providing income security for the elderly. And, given that 
families are shrinking in size, financing old age in this way will be difficult.
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Pension Systems: Not an Option Today
Coverage of mandatory contributory pension system is low. Today only 
45 percent of workers are contributing to a pension system, many of 
them irregularly. This share has been roughly constant over the last 
two decades (Figure 6.5). If the contribution patterns do not change 
BOX 6.3. PRODUCTIVITY IN AN AGING WORLD
Predicting what will happen with the saving rate as societies age is a complex 
exercise. There are several forces at play. The most direct impact of demo-
graphic changes on overall saving rates is through the age structure of the 
population. Simply put, the working-age population is doing the saving in 
countries, while elderly people consume. When the balance shifts toward an 
aging society, aggregate savings decrease; this would be the first order direct 
impact.
However, as the demographic transition continues, other forces come into 
play. Smaller families mean fewer dependents to take care of, which frees up 
resources for saving. Moreover, as life expectancies increase, rational individu-
als will save more, as they foresee longer retirement periods.
Therefore, individual responses to changes in family size and life span (El 
Mekkaoui de Freitas and Oliveira Martins, 2014) could totally or partially offset 
the effect of the change in the age structure of the population (Heller, 1989).
Attanasio et al. (2015) build and simulate a model to understand the 
quantitative impact of these forces in a context in which demographic trends 
around the world are not synchronized and capital can flow across regions. 
Under a benchmark scenario in an open economy, the saving rate of Latin 
America and the Caribbean should increase in the next two decades. The ef-
fect of having more consumers than savers would be offset by an increase 
in savings associated with smaller families and stronger saving motives for 
retirement as life expectancy increases. After that, savings in Latin America 
and the Caribbean would decline gradually as longevity stabilizes and the first 
order effect takes over.
Models like this one help explain how different forces interact in the demo-
graphic transition and affect savings. For instance, in an exercise that isolates 
the impact of fertility, the model shows that the driving force for the decrease 
in future savings, under the benchmark scenario, is lower fertility. Indeed, if 
fertility is assumed to be constant instead of decreasing, then saving rates 
should be 6 percentage points higher than in the benchmark scenario by 2100. 
Essentially, more working-age people would generate more saving.
The model can also help explain how productivity growth can contribute 
to the saving rate. Total factor productivity (TFP) is what the economy is ca-
pable of producing beyond the use of labor and capital. Attanasio et al. (2015) 
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model the benchmark scenario to assume that Latin America and the Carib-
bean converges to the productivity of more developed countries by 2150, with 
a growth rate of 1.5 percent from then on. This implies that TFP grows by 1.41 
percent per year from 2010 to 2150 in Latin America and the Caribbean to 
achieve the same level and growth rate as high-income countries.
To assess the importance of productivity on savings and future growth, 
the model explores a scenario of rapid convergence, in which it is assumed 
that the TFP level and growth in Latin America and the Caribbean will reach 
the levels of high-income countries by 2100, instead of 2150. TFP is assumed 
to grow 1.51 percent annually from 2010 to 2100. In this case, an additional 0.1 
percent of productivity growth from 2010 to 2100 can moderate the fall in 
saving rates due to lower fertility by about one-third (2 percentage points). 
Bearing in mind all the caveats of this stylized exercise, these results illustrate 
that not only does the amount of saving matter to be able to cover the needs 
of the future population, but also how countries invest those savings is im-
portant.
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on Attanasio et al. (2015).
BOX 6.3. (continued)
dramatically, coverage will be very limited for the next few generations 
as well. Between 60 and 80 million people over 65 will not have contrib-
uted for a pension in 2050 (Bosch, Melguizo, and Pagés, 2013).
Coverage is not only low, but highly inequitable as well (Figure 6.6). 
In virtually every country in the region, the poorest households are not, 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on the IDB’s Labor Markets and Social Security Indicators Sys-
tem database.
Note: Data circa 2013.

































































































Poor < US$4 Vulnerable US$4–$US10
Middle income US$10–$US50 High income > US$50
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the IDB’s Labor Markets and Social Security Indicators Sys-
tem database.
Note: Income classification as of 2005 in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. 
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and will not be, covered by mandatory pension systems. On average, 
only 15 percent of the workers with incomes below US$4 a day in pur-
chasing power parity terms (the standard moderate poverty line used in 
the region) contribute to pensions. Even the new emerging middle class 
is largely left out of pension coverage (Ferreira et al., 2013). On average, 
only 53 percent of all middle-income workers (defined as those earn-
ing between US$10 and US$50 a day in 2005 purchasing power parity 
terms) currently contribute to pensions.
Furthermore, many of those who contribute at a given moment 
in time will not become eligible for an adequate pension. Contribu-
tion densities (the share of active working life during which workers 
contribute to a pension system) are very low. In Chile, one of the coun-
tries with higher coverage, only 59 percent of men and 30 percent of 
women aged 25 to 60 have contribution densities over 50 percent 
(Berstein et al., 2006). In Mexico, El Salvador, and Peru, only between 
20 to 30 percent of men and 10 to 20 percent of women contribute 
during more than 50 percent of their active lives (Bosch, Melguizo, 
and Pagés, 2013).
On the other hand, the pension rules that still exist in many pension 
systems remain relatively generous; this will generate a regressive redis-
tribution of resources from low- to high-income households who are the 
ones that are covered (see Chapter 7). Furthermore, in some countries 
pension systems could become a source of fiscal deficits (public dissav-
ing) that could threaten their sustainability.
Every country in the region faces the same challenges with varying 
degrees of intensity according to the country’s pension system struc-
ture. Regardless of the pension arrangement (i.e., whether it be PAYG/
DB or Defined Contributions), a common trait is low active coverage. 
This pattern suggests that coverage has little to do with the actual pen-
sion system and more to do with the overall functioning of labor markets.
Plan B: Household Savings in Other Assets
Households could be preparing themselves for the future in a different way. 
They could be bypassing mandatory pension systems (working informally), 
but compensating with savings in other assets. However, little house-
hold savings is occurring outside the pension system, particularly among 
lower-income households—precisely those most often on the margin of 
the pension system. Workers, and their families, who do not contribute to 
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pensions, do not save more than workers who contribute. On the contrary, 
surveys in Brazil, Mexico, and Peru show that informal workers (who do not 
contribute to pensions) save less at every income level (see Figure 6.7). 
Furthermore, not only do informal workers save less at every income level 
they largely do so through informal means (see Chapter 3).
These patterns are occurring during a generally favorable time to 
save in demographic terms. Since the society is still relatively young in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, savings should be high. However, sav-
ing rates do not always respond to movements in demographics. Asia is 
Figure 6.7 Share of Workers Who Report Savings in the Previous Year
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Base of Pyramid (BoP) Survey.
Note: The survey excludes the richest 30 percent of the households in each country. The decile 
distribution maps the poorest 70 percent of the households.
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the only major region in the world to substantially increase savings dur-
ing the demographic dividend (Cavallo, Sánchez, and valenzuela, 2016). 
The decline in the dependency ratio can explain 22 percent of the sav-
ing increases between 1963 and 2012 in Asia, but only 3 percent in Latin 
America and the Caribbean during the same period.
Why doesn’t Latin America and the Caribbean seem to be tak-
ing advantage of good demographics to increase saving? There are 
multiple reasons. Despite the last decade of growth, the region is still 
relatively poor and unequal. Many individuals and families cannot cover 
basic needs. A relatively large segment of the population earns too little 
to accumulate substantial savings in general, much less for a potential 
retirement, be it through formal pension contributions or through non-
pension instruments. According to social protection surveys in Mexico 
and Peru (IDB, 2008), approximately 30 percent of those who do not 
contribute give insufficient income as the main reason (see Figure 6.8). 
This situation could explain the high correlation between a country’s per 
capita income and the percentage of formal workers (Loayza, Oviedo, 
and Servén, 2005) as well as the relationship between an individual’s 
income level and the probability that he or she will save for retirement 
(see Figure 6.6). It could also explain why the demographic dividend has 
had little effect on saving patterns in the region.
Figure 6.8 Why Don’t Workers Contribute to Pensions?
0 40
Percentage of workers not contributing to pensions
MexicoPeru
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Others
I don’t trust pension fund managers
I am negligent / I’m not interested
I was forced to
Irregular earnings
I am not required to
I am unfamiliar with the system
I don’t have enough money
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Social Protection Survey in Mexico City and Metropolitan 
Lima, Peru (IDB, 2008).
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While for low-income workers saving for retirement may not be 
feasible, it is less clear why the middle class in Latin America and the 
Caribbean is not saving enough. Income restriction should be less of an 
issue. However, all potential savers confront several barriers to generat-
ing savings for retirement outside mandatory pension systems. Chapter 
9 explores two likely explanations. The first is a general lack of trust in 
the financial system and low effective returns to financial savings. Sec-
ond, proactive savings behavior (particularly long-term savings) may 
be undermined by behavioral biases, including present bias, discount 
factors, myopia, agency problems within the household, and pure irra-
tionality.8 Given these limitations, relying on saving outside a mandatory 
pension system almost guarantees that resources to finance pensions 
will be insufficient.
The Last Resort: Taking Care of Grandma
Many Latin American and Caribbean citizens who do not contribute to 
mandatory pension systems hope they will be able to support themselves 
by remaining in the labor market. Labor income is an important source 
of income in old age, at least between ages 60 and 80 (Figure 6.9). A 
large majority of informal workers in the region rely on working until a 
very advanced age (Bosch, Melguizo, and Pagés, 2013). However, labor 
supply patterns in the region suggest that very few people are willing or 
able to work past 80. Only 17 percent of men and 6 percent of women 
are working by the time they turn 80. Unless labor support patterns 
change dramatically, labor income will not be a reliable source of fund-
ing for old age.
The other source of support for the elderly outside pension systems 
is the family. Families have traditionally been the most reliable safety 
net for the elderly.9 In 2013, around 57 percent of adults 65 and older 
were living with working-age family members (not including spouses). 
However, families are unlikely to be a reliable source of support as aging 
continues. The average woman in 1950 in Latin America and the Carib-
bean had six children. In 2015, the average woman had just enough 
children to maintain the population level (around 2.1). The implications 
of this dramatic shift are just emerging. From 2000 to 2013, household 
surveys reveal that the average size of households shared by adults 65 
and older and working-age population decreased by 9 percent (from 
4.4 to 4 members), mimicking an overall trend of smaller households 
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in the region. In just 13 years, the average household in Latin America 
and the Caribbean decreased by 12 percent (from 4.9 to 4.3 members). 
Several demographic, cultural, and economic trends may be behind this 
decline, but one thing is certain; families are getting smaller. Maintain-
ing the elderly will be more difficult without rapid economic growth. 
Smaller families will have fewer descendants to take care of elderly par-
ents. Meanwhile, parents have children at a later age. Thus, working-age 
parents may have to take care of their children, parents, and grandpar-
ents. Women, who are traditionally the main caregivers of the elderly, 
will likely suffer the most from these changes in family structure.
Act Today, for a Better Tomorrow
Aging is a reality that countries will have to face in the future, but the 
future is approaching rapidly. Longer lives are certainly good news; 
however, longer lives will not be better lives if there is no appropriate 
Figure 6.9 Sources of Income in Old Age 
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Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Saad (2011).
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financing. Latin American and Caribbean countries, like all regions 
around the world, will have to face this challenge.
The dramatic transformation in the age profile in the region and the 
changes that it will bring are difficult for both citizens and policymakers 
to grasp. In principle, individuals could predict the changes in demo-
graphics and take the appropriate steps to secure their future income 
by saving more. However, people do not save enough for retirement in 
the region. Many must contend with immediate needs. Others do not 
foresee their future needs or think they will be able to work until a very 
advanced age. Indeed, this is the main reason pension systems around 
the world have compulsory social arrangements. However, compulsory 
arrangements by and large have failed to prepare the countries of the 
region for the demographic change.  While policymakers clearly rec-
ognize the challenge, the problem seems too far away and beyond the 
scope of the typical four-year mandate.
What policies can secure the necessary resources for the aging pop-
ulation without compromising other competing needs? Saving more for 
the future could play a central role, but only if it addresses the funda-
mental challenges of an aged society. Saving per se will not necessarily 
secure the funds needed to take care of large numbers of elderly in the 
future. A large generation followed by a small one implies that savings 
might have lower returns and higher volatility. Savings not only need to 
be higher, they must be mobilized in a way that enhances productivity 
and generates economic growth. This is the only way that countries will 
be able to afford the ever-increasing costs of an aging society.
Although the window of opportunity is closing on the demographic 
dividend, Latin America and the Caribbean has significant room to grow 
in the coming years. Well-designed pension systems that are better pre-
pared to cope with aging will be crucial to meeting this challenge. How 
to reform these systems to increase coverage in sustainable ways while 
at the same time dealing with an aging population will be covered in the 
next chapter.
Increasing savings and funding the pension systems now could 
boost the economy and prepare for the graying of the region. The cur-
rent age composition in the region supports these steps. Seizing this 
opportunity in Latin America and the Caribbean in the decades to come 
will be vital to secure the region’s future.
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Notes
1 The demographic dividend is defined by the United Nations Popula-
tion Fund (UNFPA) as “the economic growth potential that can result 
from shifts in a population’s age structure, mainly when the share of 
the working-age population (15 to 64) is larger than the non-working-
age share of the population (14 and younger, and 65 and older).”
2 For a global perspective of the aging phenomenon, see Lee and 
Mason (2011b).
3 Between 1993 and 2013, around 60 percent of the GDP per capita 
growth in the region was due to increases in employment because of 
population growth, while the other 40 percent was due to increases in 
output per worker (Alaimo et al., 2015).
4 FADL include activities such as walking, eating, dressing, and toilet-
ing. IADL include activities such as shopping, answering the phone, 
preparing food, housekeeping, and the ability to handle finances.
5 This analogy and the text in section draws on Barr (2002) and Barr 
and Diamond (2009).
6 Something that is not observable is the path that countries that 
switched from PAYG/DB to fully funded private accounts might have 
followed if they continued unreformed. In this sense, systems with 
escalating costs and potential pressures to increase benefits or relax 
access to benefits could have ended up with large deficits and conse-
quently important dissaving.
7 However, it is important to understand how those “pension” promises 
are made (see Chapter 7).
8 For evidence of insufficient savings for retirement in the United King-
dom, see Banks, Blundell, and Tanner (1998).
9 For a discussion of how transfers across generations may act as a sub-
stitute for savings in the absence of well-functioning private annuity 
markets, see Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) and Kotlikoff (1988).
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